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RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

IN UNION MEMBERSHIP

The Supreme Court of the United States in recent years has held
discrimination in partially state supported schools unconstitutional.' It has
also held that discriminatory acts in the federally controlled school system
are violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 2 Can this
doctrine of school integration be applied to membership in labor unions?
Is racial separation and exclusion, inherently unequal in public schooling,
a fortiori unequal in the exercise of federal statutory bargaining power?
If it is, should labor unions exercising federal statutory bargaining powers
be required to admit negroes to membership?
A recent United States District Court case, Oliphant v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Enginemen 6 Firemen,3 may put this issue squarely before
the United States Supreme Court. 4 In the Oliphant case, negroes were
refused admission to the Brotherhood solely because of color. The Brotherhood was the exclusive bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act5
for both white and negro firemen. The district court admitted the
action was discriminatory, but denied the negroes admittance to the
union. The opinion stated that the union was a private organization and
certification as exclusive bargaining agent by the National Mediation
Board1 did not clothe the union with the attributes of a federal agency
so as to avail the petitioners relief under the fifth amendment. 8
Ever since Gibbons v. Ogden," Congress has expanded its power to
regulate intercourse among the states"' to include almost everything that
can reasonably be said to touch or affect interstate commerce." Railroads
operating among the states quite naturally fall within the area of congressional control. Federal regulations for safety 12 have been held constitutional; even when the regulation extended to control intrastate rates,11
1. Florida ex rel Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 350 U.S. 413 (1956);
Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kansas, 347

U.S. 488 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
2. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
3. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 156 F. Supp.
89 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
4. The Oliphant case was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 27 U.S.L.
WEEx 2271 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1958).
5. Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151-163 (1952).
6. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 156 F. Supp.
89, 91 (N.D. Ohio 1957). "There is no question that the evidence presented established the fact that these plaintiffs and members of their class are discriminated against
in respect of their representation and participation; their conditions of employment, and
other matters relating to such employment."
7. Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
9. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
10. U. S. CONST. art I, § 8.
11. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
12. Southern Ry v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
13. Railway Comm'rs. of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 257
U.S. 563 (1922).
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it was held to affect interstate commerce and thus became the proper
subject of federal regulation. The federal commerce power is indeed as
"broad as the economic needs of the nation. ' ' 4
The problems of the interstate carrier have become national. When
local manufacturing disturbances were held to affect the manufactured
product in interstate commerce, 15 the national legislature felt the need to
establish federal agencies which would promote industrial peace within the
railroads that transported the manufactured product among the states. 16
Quarrels arising between the railroads and the unions representing the
workers come under the purview of the commerce clause, and the federal
courts have primary jurisdiction 17 to enforce this congressional act which
is supreme to state laws and constitutions. 8
Federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain non-diversity suits under
the National Labor Relations Act.' The interstate commerce labor field
is pre-empted by the federal action, and states may not regulate labor
relations which fall within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. 20 This is true even though the National Labor Relations Board
has declined to assert its jurisdiction. 2 1 Whenever there is no administrative
remedy under the Railway Labor Act, there is also a right to go into the
federal courts.2 2 Internal issues concerning the duly designated bargaining
agent are not justiciable for the federal courts,2 3 nor does the district court
generally have jurisdiction to review action of the National Mediation
Board in issuing the certificates of representation.24 Of course, before the
aggrieved party can invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts he must
exhaust his administrative remedies.25
The actions of the exclusive bargaining union under the Railway Labor
Act come under federal jurisdiction; and the union must represent fairly
14. American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n., 329 U.S. 90
(1946).
15. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
16. Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1952).
17. Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956).
Which held
that the Railway Labor Act, allowing closed shops, is not violative of first or fifth
amendments and within the power of Congress notwithstanding state constitutions
to the contrary.
19. Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U. S. 210 (1944).
20. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1956).
21. Cuss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. I (1957); Comment, 18 LA.
L. Rxv. 149 (1957).
22. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 (1952); Graham
v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U. S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U. S.
210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944). Compare,

Hayes v. Union Pac. R. R., 88 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Calif. 1950).
23. General Comm. v. M-K-'T R. R., 320 U. S. 323 (1943); General Comm. v.
Southern Pac. R. R., 320 U. S.338 (1943).
24. Switchmen's Union v.Board, 320 U S. 297 (1943).
25. Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461 (1931); Goldsmith v. Board
of Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926); Martin v. Favell, 344 Mich. 215, 73 N. W. 2d
856 (1955).
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all members and non-members. "5 Contract discrimination founded upon
color would be violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The Steele case 27 is representative of this class action against a union whose
constitution denies negroes membership; and where the union is the
exclusive bargaining agent for the negro as well as its own members. The
union, being held as a quasi-governmental agency in this respect, may not
bargain to the detriment of the negro. 28 Nor can the exclusive bargaining
agent discriminate as to the auxiliary colored union. 29 The separate but
equal doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson-0 has been overruled in the school
system, and there is no reason to continue its application in the labor
union. A labor union functioning as a bargaining agent under the Railway
Labor Act is not to be regarded as a wholly private association of individuals
free from all constitutional or statutory restraints to which public agencies
are subjected.1
If the state courts were requested to decide questions involving union
discrimination, a judgment for the union should be held within the doctrine

of Shelly v. Kraemer.3 2 This discriminatory act by the union enforced by
the state would then be an act of the state prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment? 3 At least one state court has found union discrimination to
be a violation of state and national public policy without recourse to the
fourteenth amendment? 4 Thus, an appeal to the state court by the negro
worker for union membership when denied by the court, becomes a state
act of discrimination and unconstitutional under the fourteenth amend35

ment.
Even if the labor union must fairly represent all for whom it purports
to bargain, must it admit all into membership regardless of color? Can the
union represent all fairly and still be discriminate in its membership?
The first case characterizing labor unions as voluntary associations was
decided in 1880."1 Since then there has never been a legally protected
right to join a union.3 7 It has been held that labor unions have a legal
26. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 (1952); Graham
v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U. S. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U. S.
210 (1944); Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944); Graham
v. Southern Ry., 74 F. Supp. 663 (D. C. 1947).
27. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944).
28. Comments, 1953 Wis. L. Rrv. 516 (1953); 5 STAN. L. REv. 135 (1952).
29. James v.Marineship Corp., 85 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Betts v.
Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Plessy v.Ferguson, 163 U. S.537 (1896).
Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
Shelly v.Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Ilurd v.Hodge, 334 U. S.24 (1948).
U. S. CONST. amend, XIV, § 1.

James v. Marineship Corp., 85 Cal. 2d 721, 155 Pf62d 329 (1914).
Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N. W. 2d 315 (1957); Haller, Racial Discrimination in Unions, 8 Ba-. L. J. 479 (1957).
36. Mayer v.Journeymen Stonecutter's Assn., 49 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (Ch.
1890. Cameron v.International Alliance, etc.,
118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692 (1935);
Sommes, The Right to Joint a Union, 47 COL. L. Rav. 33, (1947).
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right to determine the eligibility of its own niembership. 8 The state
courts have been unwilling to set aside union constitutions barring colored
members, 30 or to force the union to accept persons it had deemed unacceptable for any reason; color among them, and thus to turn a voluntary
organization into an involuntary one. 40 The courts are not concerned " ' with
the membership qualifications of a union which is a voluntary private
organization. This leads us to 'a position in which the unions may discriminate by excluding negroes from membership, but may not discriminate in
bargaining for the negro workers it represents.
In the instant case 42 the argument of the petitioners alleged that the
non-admittance is in itself discrimination because the negro worker did
not have a vote in the election of bargaining officials or in the formulation
of bargaining objectives. 43 The petitioners further argued that the protection
of the fifth amendment included their right to membership in the union,
for negro firemen could not obtain equal representation without voice and
vote in the bargaining process. 44 The petitioners here did not complain
that the bargaining acts of the defendant union had been discriminatory
as in the Steele case 45 and subsequent cases.46 The question was whether
the denial of membership to negroes standing alone fell within the
protection of the Constitution.
In the closed shop, the Railway Labor Act provides that negroes must
be admitted. 47 A closed shop was made non-discriminatory on the theory
that the discrimination would be a denial of the right to work for a nonmember could not work in a closed shop. The closed shop is not mandatory
38. Cameron v. International Alliance, etc., 118 N.J. Eq. 11, 176 At. 692 (1935);
Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N. W. 2d 315 (1957).
39. Martin v, Favell, 344 Mich. 215, 73 N. \V. 2d 856 (1955).
40. Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N. W. 2d 315 (1957).
41. Rolax v, Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 91 F. Supp. 585 (E. I). \a. 1950).
42. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 156 F. Supp.
89 (N.D. Ohio 1957), a'd 27 U.S.L. WEEK 2271 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1958).
43. Brief for Appellants, p. (i).
44. Ibid.
45. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
46. Conley v. Gibson, 352 U. S. 818 (1957) (Latest in a series of cases affirming the Steele case.)
47. Railway Labor Act. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951). 45 U. S. C. § 152, Eleventh.
any carrier or carriers as defined in this act and a labor organization or labor
organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with
the requirements of the act Shall be permitted(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued emplovment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is later, all ernplovees shall become members of the labor organization representing their
craft or class: Provided, that no such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership
is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally
applicable to any other member or with respect employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not
including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
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under the Railway Labor Act, only permissive.4 8 There need not be a
closed shop and apparently the unions keep an open shop in order to
remain discriminatory in their membership. However, a closed shop under
the Railway Labor Act is valid notwithstanding state laws or constitutions
outlawing them.40
The case at hand deals with the opei shop. In the open shop, the
Railway Labor Act makes no provision for non discrimination in membership.50 Obviously Congress could have so provided. 5 1 In the open shop,
courts have only gone so far as to protect negro non-members from unfair
representation in bargaining. The right so far delineated is for fair representation 2 not membership.
Is this position, that an organization created to bargain for the worker
can privately discriminate in its membership and at the same time carry
out its avowed purpose to represent all fairly, tenable?
Generally, the legal discussions of the Oliphant case have pointed
towards the support of the negro workers. 53 The arguments against racial
discrimination in union membership are basically two. The first argument
reasons that the fair representation guaranteed by the Railway Labor
Act as interpreted in the Steel case54 necessarily includes the right to join
that union; that the denial of participation in the union is incompatible
with the requirements of equal representation."5 Secondly, the labor union
when certified by the National Mediation Board becomes a quasi federal
agency,5 1 and certification is therefore sanction by the government of
discrimination 57 which is prohibited by the fifth amendment. Less concrete
arguments available are that non-membership would be a denial of
economic opportunity, and that discrimination in membership would create
a second-class citizenship.
Summarizing the position of the unions, 'we find that the unions
are a voluntary organization under no obligation to accept all into membership . 8 Congress has not intended to make unions non:discrimina'tory.59
48. See note 47 supra; "...
shallbe, permitted
49. Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson; 351 U. S. 225, 233 (1956)
is supreme and cannot be invalidated by any state law.).

(fRdeial law
.

50. Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. § 151 (1952).
51. 104 Cor~c. REC. 6635 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1958). The United.States Senate
on April 26, 1958, defeated a bill introduced by Senator Knowland to prohibit unions
from discrimination; 96 CoNe. REc. 16377 (1951) (a bill was tabled which would
have prohibited certification of.a union which discriminates in membership).
52. See note 26 supra.
53. Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8. LAB, L.J. 8t4 (1957);

notes, :12 RUTCERS L. REv. 543 (1958), 29 Miss. L.I. 335 (1958).
54.- Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R., R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944).
55. Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934.). 45 U. S. C. §. 152, fourth, "Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively. through representatives
of their own choosing."
56. See note 29 supra.
57. Comment, 12 RUTGERs L. REV. 543 (1958)
58. See notes 37-41 supra.
59. See note 51 s-upra.
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Under the Steele case, the certified bargaining union need only represent
all fairly. That the union is not discriminating against the negro workers
in bargaining is not denied.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet determined the problem. 60
It must eventually meet it squarely and the desirability of increased
federal control in labor will have to be weighed against its -true effect. 61
That-is, will forced membership assure fair representation? "2 If the Supreme
Court follows its reasoning in the school segregation cases, it must hold
for the negro. That this edict from the highest court in our land would
establish equality is strongly doubted. Perhaps it is time to review the
value judgments of what is good for the people and allow individual
enterprise to rise or fall without governmental interference.
HENRY J. PROMINSK

60. The Oliphant case was denied certiorari by the United States' Supreme Court.
355 U. S. 893 (1958).
61. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation; Federal Responsibility
in a Federal System, 67 YALE L. J. 1327 (1958).
62. Vhitfield v. Steelworkers Local 2708, 156 F. Supp. 430 (S.' D. Tex. 1957).
(Wherein negroes complained of discrimination even though they were members and
officers in the union).

